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Abstract: Non-victims who express high versus low personal belief in a just world (PBJW) are judged as 
having more social value, both social utility (i.e., market value) and social desirability (i.e., affective value). 
Our goal was to test whether this pattern differed when the targets were presented as innocent or non-
innocent victims of enduring suffering. A hundred and eighty-six participants of both sexes took part in 
our 2 (degree of PBJW expressed: high/low) X 3 (Target identity: innocent victim/ non-innocent victim/ 
non-victim) between-subjects experimental study. Participants rated the targets on four measures: 
positive/negative social utility/desirability. Targets were judged more positively and less negatively if 
they expressed high versus low PBJW, regardless of their being non-victims or (non-)innocent victims. 
This pattern is taken as further evidence that the expression of high PBJW is a judgment norm, that is, a 
socially valued discourse irrespective of it being true or untrue. 
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Será que as vítimas também são julgadas mais positivamente se disserem que as suas vidas são 
justas? Alvos apresentados como não-vítimas e que exprimem uma crença num mundo pessoal justo 
(CMJ pessoal) alta versus baixa são julgados como tendo mais valor social, tanto utilidade social (i.e., valor 
de mercado) como desejabilidade social (i.e., valor afetivo). O nosso objetivo foi testar se este padrão 
difere quando os alvos são apresentados como vítimas inocentes ou não inocentes de sofrimento 
prolongado. Cento e oitenta e seis indivíduos de ambos os sexos participaram num estudo experimental 
inter-participantes 2 (grau de CMJ pessoal expressa: alta/baixa) X 3 (identidade dos alvos: vítima 
inocente/ vítima não inocente/ não vítima). Os/as participantes avaliaram os alvos em quatro medidas: 
utilidade social positiva e negativa e desejabilidade social positiva e negativa. Os alvos foram avaliados 
mais positivamente e menos negativamente se exprimiram CMJ pessoal alta versus baixa, 
independentemente de serem vítimas (não) inocentes ou não vítimas. Interpretamos este padrão como 
representando mais evidência de que a expressão de CMJ pessoal constitui uma norma de julgamento, 
isto é, um discurso valorizado socialmente, independentemente de ser ou não verdadeiro.  
 
Palavras-chave: Crença num mundo pessoal justo; Valor social; Utilidade social; Desejabilidade social; 
Vítimas. 
 
In a globalized world such as ours, where people have permanent access to information, individuals are 
exposed to numerous examples of injustice. Furthermore, they themselves have most likely been targets 
of injustice. Surprisingly, individuals are supposed to say the world is just, especially when they refer to 
their lives. Indeed, research has found that individuals who say their lives are just (e.g., "I generally get 
what I deserve.") are evaluated more positively than those who display the opposite discourse (e.g., "I 
rarely get what I deserve."; Alves & Correia, 2008, 2010a; Testé & Perrin, 2013). The expression of high 
versus low personal belief in a just world (PBJW; Dalbert, 1999) is thus a more socially valued discourse. 
Nevertheless, in most studies on the social value of PBJW, targets who say their lives are (un)just are 
simply presented as university students. Is high versus low PBJW also more socially valued when other 
categories of individuals express that idea?  
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IUL), under Hélder Vinagreiro Alves tutorship. We consider the contributions as equivalent. The authors’ names thus simply reflect 
their alphabetical order. Hélder Vinagreiro Alves proposed the research idea which the other authors developed. They created and 
pre-tested the non-victim condition, pre-tested the victim conditions and the dependent measures. Analyses were conducted 
together. 
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 In the study we report here our main goal was to test whether the social value of high versus low 
PBJW is resistant to strong evidence that the world is not just for the target. If that is the case, we will 
have further evidence regarding the strength of PBJW social value. On the contrary, if there is one 
category of people to whom affirming versus denying justice for themselves is ill-suited, we will have 
obtained first-hand evidence regarding the limits of high PBJW social value. We thus manipulated the 
identity of the targets who say their lives are generally versus rarely just by using central categories in 
just-world theory (Lerner, 1980) - innocent and non-innocent victims. Furthermore, we also presented 
non-victims displaying the same discourses. The non-victims category allowed us to replicate previous 
research and to compare the social value of PBJW they express with that expressed by innocent and non-
innocent victims. 
 
The Belief in a Just World as a Motivation and as a Discourse 
Just-world theory (Lerner, 1980) has focused on the “BJW” as motivation. Its main assumption is that 
individuals need to perceive the world as a just place where people, themselves included, get what they 
deserve and deserve what they get (Lerner & Simmons, 1966). Such need motivates individuals to 
unconsciously perceive the world as a just place and to behave and reason in that fashion (Callan, Sutton, 
Harvey, & Dawtry, 2014; Lerner, 1980). Indeed, research has shown that observers often derogate or/and 
blame victims. These reactions occur primarily towards victims who are objectively responsible for their 
plight (or “non-innocent victims”). Surprisingly, victims who are not responsible for their plight (or 
“innocent victims”) are also derogated or/and blamed (e.g., Correia, Vala, & Aguiar, 2001), albeit to a 
lesser extent than non-innocent victims, for they pose a threat to people’s BJW (Correia, Vala, & Aguiar, 
2007). Innocent victims are paradoxically more derogated/blamed by individuals who are chronically 
(i.e., “high believers in a just world”) or situationally more concerned about justice (e.g., through 
priming). This occurs especially when innocent victims are closer to the observers' world and their 
suffering cannot be relieved (e.g., Correia et al., 2012; Correia & Vala, 2003). 
A recent line of research, however, has focused on studying the BJW as a discourse. Its main 
assumption is that the expression of BJW is a more socially than individually motivated discourse (Alves, 
2012). According to this approach, individuals are expected to state the world is just rather than unjust, 
especially in contexts where the notion of individual merit is central (e.g., schools, companies). In those 
contexts at least, the "world is generally just" discourse has become prescriptive. The prescriptive aspect 
of the “world is generally just “discourse does not derive from it being necessarily truer than the “world is 
generally unjust” discourse. Instead, its prescriptive aspect derives from the fact that it contributes to the 
legitimation of the evaluative practices in those contexts (e.g., to fail or pass students; to promote or 
dismiss workers). In this respect, the “just world discourse” is a “judgment norm” (Dubois, 2005). 
Individuals who evaluate others in those contexts thus expect them to express that idea whether or not it 
reflects reality. In turn, those who are evaluated learn that such discourse has social value. This social 
value is stronger, however, when individuals are referring to their lives rather than to the lives of people 
in general (Alves & Correia, 2010a,b). Indeed, Testé and Perrin (2013) characterized the expression of the 
idea that the world is just for people in general as normatively ambivalent. That is why in this study we 
have focused on the social value of high (versus low) PBJW - e.g., "I generally [rarely] get what I deserve" - 
rather than on the social value of high (versus low) general BJW (Dalbert, Montada, & Schmitt, 1987) - 
e.g., "People generally [rarely] get what they deserve".  
Social value comprises two evaluative dimensions (Beauvois, 1995): social utility and social 
desirability. Whereas social utility indicates the market value of an object, social desirability indicates its 
affective value (Beauvois & Dépret, 2008; Cambon, 2006). Either dimension of social value can be positive 
or negative. Positive social utility refers to the characteristics leading to success in contexts and societies 
based on individualism and meritocracy (e.g., entrepreneurial, ambitious), and negative social utility 
comprises the characteristics that are detrimental to success (e.g., passive, unambitious). Positive social 
desirability refers to the characteristics that make an object socially attractive (e.g., warm, kind), and 
negative social desirability comprises the characteristics than make an object socially unattractive (e.g., 
aloof, unkind). 
Several studies have consistently found that individuals expressing high PBJW (i.e., a justice-
affirming discourse about the self) are more socially valued than those who express low PBJW (i.e., a 
justice-denying discourse about the self). Specifically, bogus university students who expressed high 
versus low PBJW were judged as more socially useful and desirable (Alves & Correia, 2010a; Testé, 
Maisonneuve, Assilaméhou, & Perrin, 2012; Testé & Perrin, 2013; see also Alves & Correia, 2013). 
Furthermore, individuals used higher scores of PBJW to convey general and specific positive (versus 
negative) images of themselves (Alves & Correia, 2008, 2010b). These patterns led Alves and Correia 
(2010a) to regard the expression of PBJW as judgments norms, that is, as socially valued statements 
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irrespective of their being true or false (Dubois, 2000, 2005). In fact, Alves and Correia (2010a) found that 
the expression of high versus low PBJW was more approved of. Yet, the two discourses were judged as 
equally untrue. 
 
Limitations of Past Research and Overview of the Current Study 
Despite the valuable insights the aforementioned lines of research have offered to our understanding of 
social life, they have been conducted separately. To our knowledge at least, most research on the social 
value of PBJW expression has used targets simply presented as university students (e.g., Alves & Correia, 
2010a; for an exception, see Testé et al., 2012). Thus, these targets have most probably been perceived as 
non-victims. In our study we intended to expand on these findings by also using victims as targets who 
say their lives are generally versus rarely just. In our view, this has interesting implications. 
 Indeed, being a victim is an aversive identity and, in specific cases, it is even a stigma. For 
instance, Goffman (1963/1990) included disfigurement and physical disability in the category of 
“abominations of the body”. People usually avoid these categories of victims and perceive them as 
relatively useless (see also Stangor & Crandall, 2003). Hence, the judged social value of these victims is 
low. Nevertheless, consistent with “the social norm of victim’s objective evaluation” (Correia & Vala, 
2003, p. 383), research also suggests that the social value of victims may vary according to their 
responsibility for their situation. Specifically, Alves and Correia (2009, 2013) found that individuals 
approved more of supportive reactions towards a disfigured and physically disabled victim, if they were 
presented as innocent rather than non-innocent. As we interpret these results, even though the social 
value of (physically) stigmatized people is low on the whole (Goffman, 1963/1990), it is even lower if 
they are (versus are not) responsible for their stigma. In other words, the social value of non-innocent 
victims is lower than that of innocent victims. It is thus possible that the social value of the targets may 
moderate the attributed social value of their discourses on personal (in)justice. Nevertheless, to our 
knowledge, research on the expression of PBJW has not manipulated the identity of the targets.  
As in previous research, some participants in our study read that the targets were average 
university students (i.e., non-victims). Other participants read that the targets were university students 
who had had a road accident resulting in very serious and permanent suffering (disfigurement and 
physical disabilities). The victims were presented as either responsible or not responsible for the accident 
(i.e., non-innocent or innocent victims, respectively). We then asked participants to rate the targets on 
social utility and social desirability. This strategy allowed us to ascertain whether the notion of a just 
world for oneself is a socially valued discourse when both non-victims (as in prior research) and victims 
express it. This strategy also allowed us to test whether the social value of PBJW depends on the fact that 
the victims are presented as innocent or non-innocent.  
We believe this is an important step towards a broader understanding of the PBJW social value. In 
fact, if we find that individuals expect both victims and non-victims to express high PBJW, we will have 
gathered further (and counter-intuitive) evidence regarding the strength of its social value. This will be 
especially true if there are no differences between the innocent and the non-innocent victims. On the 
contrary, if we find that the expression of PBJW is expected differently for victims and non-victims and/or 
between innocent and non-innocent victims, we will have identified a boundary condition for its social 
value. 
 
Hypotheses 
Reflecting the social value of PBJW, we expected that the targets who expressed high versus low PBJW 
would be judged more positively2 (main effect of PBJW expressed; H1); Reflecting the different social 
value of the targets, we expected the non-victims would be judged more positively than the innocent 
victims and these would be judged more positively than the non-innocent victims (main effect of target 
identity, H2); We also expected an interaction effect between PBJW expressed and target identity. 
Nevertheless, there are three possible (and mutually exclusive) groups of predictions for the interaction.  
Focusing on the victimized targets, the patterns of this interaction depend on the weight, which we 
could not predict a priori, that participants gave to three different factors: victim suffering, the degree of 
PBJW they expressed, or/and their innocence. If participants focused on the fact that these targets suffer 
very much, it is likely that their judgments reflected a compassionate “no one deserves such fate” 
reasoning. If that were the case, we should expect both the innocent and the non-innocent victims to be 
judged more positively when they expressed low versus high PBJW (contrary to the non-victims) (H3). If 
                                                        
2 For the sake of brevity, in the hypotheses we use the phrase “more positively judged”. Given that there are positive and negative 
dimensions of social value, that phrase should be understood as “more positively judged on the positive dimensions of social value 
and less negatively judged on the negative dimensions of social value”.  
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participants focused on what the targets said, we should expect their judgments to reflect the social value 
of PBJW. In this case, we expected both the innocent and the non-innocent victims to be judged more 
positively when they expressed high versus low PBJW (but less so than their non-victim counterparts 
because of their higher social value; H4). If participants took into account not only what the targets said 
but also whether they are innocent or non-innocent (thus, being judged as less or more deserving of 
suffering, respectively), we should expect: the innocent victim expressing low versus high PBJW to be 
judged more positively (H5.1); the non-innocent victim expressing high versus low PBJW to be judged 
more positively (H5.2); the innocent victim expressing high PBJW to be judged as negatively as the non-
innocent victim expressing low PBJW (H5.3); the innocent victim expressing low PBJW to be judged as 
positively as the non-innocent victim expressing high PBJW (H5.4). Note that if our results support 
Hypotheses 5.1 - 5.4, they will indicate that participants based their judgments not on the social value of 
PBJW, but on perceived “truth”, that is, on the match between victim responsibility and how just or unjust 
the victims judge their situation. As a result, if these hypotheses receive support, we will have identified 
an example showing that the expression of high PBJW is not always valued3. 
 
METHOD 
Participants 
Our sample comprises 186 university students of both sexes (116 females, 70 males) studying in Lisbon 
(Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia, Faculdade de Direito, Faculdade de Letras, Instituto Superior de 
Economia e Gestão). Their ages ranged between 18 and 37 (M = 21.12, SD = 2.29). 
 
Procedure 
The experimenters approached potential participants and invited them to take part in the study. After 
agreeing to participate, the experimenters handed them an informed consent form. Participants read the 
study was about people perception and would take them between 10 to 15 minutes to complete. It also 
stressed that their participation was voluntary and their responses would remain anonymous. After 
signing the consent form, they were handed a block of stapled sheets of paper. 
On the first page they were thanked for participating, read how the study would be conducted and 
indicated their age and sex. Next, they read a text which manipulated the non-victim or the victim 
conditions. It was followed by another text which manipulated the expression of PBJW. Then, participants 
answered the manipulation checks. Afterwards, they rated the target on adjectives which operationalized 
the positive and negative dimensions of social value. Finally, participants were given another sheet of 
paper which debriefed them about the goals of the study. 
 
Independent variables 
This experimental study has a 2 (degree of expressed PBJW: high/ low) X 3 (target identity: non-victim/ 
innocent victim/ non-innocent victim) between-participants design. These variables were manipulated 
through texts which were distributed randomly among participants. 
Expressed PBJW was manipulated as in Alves and Correia (2010a). The text comprised three 
excerpts from a bogus 50-minute interview with the target. In fact, the sentences were simply the items of 
Dalbert (1999) PBJW scale to which several expressions were added to emulate oral speech. An example 
of expressed high [low] PBJW was: “(minute 8): “I think that I generally [rarely] get what I deserve: 
overall, events in my life are [not] just... That’s it: I believe that most of the things that happen in my life 
are [not] fair, that I usually [rarely] deserve what happens to me.” (. . . ).” 
As far as the targets are concerned, two were presented as victims and one as a non-victim. Victim 
innocence and non-innocence were operationalized as in Alves and Correia (2009, 2013). In the innocent 
condition participants read that the victim had been driving carefully and at low speed, but they4 lost 
control of the car due to spilt oil on the road. In the non-innocent condition, participants read the victim 
                                                        
3 As one anonymous reviewer pointed out, from a motivational point of view we could expect different patterns for these 
hypotheses. In this view both the innocent victim and the expression of low PBJW represent threats to individuals’ BJW. As a 
strategy to restore their BJW, and contrary to our hypotheses, participants could thus be expected to judge the innocent victim who 
expresses low PBJW more negatively than the other victims. Nevertheless, we think this possibility would be more likely if the 
victims had expressed low general BJW. In our reasoning, such discourse would more strongly remind the participants that their 
world can also be unjust and that they themselves can also be victims of injustice. We are not saying this could not occur with the 
expression of low PBJW, but that it seems more likely with the expression of low GBJW. If the mere expression of low GBJW is 
indeed threatening to individuals’ “fundamental delusion” (Lerner, 1980), we could also predict that this pattern would be stronger 
among high versus low believers in a just world, or among those experiencing an emotionally arousing situation. 
4 In English it is possible to use "they", "their" or "them" to refer to just one person in order to avoid "he/she", his/her", or 
"him/her". These double references were used in our study (e.g., “ele/ela”) because there is no equivalent linguistic device in 
Portuguese. 
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had been driving drunk, recklessly and at high speed. As a result, the victim lost control of the car while 
taking a turn. In both victim innocence conditions, participants read that the car fell off a cliff and the 
consequences for the victims were presented as very serious and permanent (e.g., 85% of the body burnt, 
disfigurement, no eyelids, need of constant eye lubrication, need of permanent medical care for their 
whole life). Participants also read that the victims self-described as typical university students before the 
accident. In the non-victim condition participants read a text about the daily routine of a young person 
who self-described as a typical university student. The information provided comprised their study and 
eating habits, their hobbies and the means of transportation they used to go to university. In all three 
conditions the targets were referred to as "X". The word "victim" was never used in the texts and no 
sociodemographic information about them was provided. 
 
Manipulation Checks  
We checked whether our degree of PBJW expressed and victim innocence manipulations were perceived 
as intended and whether the three targets were judged as suffering to different extents. Participants thus 
read that it was important for us to know whether the texts were clearly written. For that purpose, we 
asked them to answer to nine items (seven for the participants in the non-victim conditions). They read: 
"Thus, based on what you have just read, which you can reread if you so wish, you think that: (please, 
answer by using the numbers from 1 to 7)". 
 
Degree of PBJW expressed (two items; r = .78, p < .001). “ X said they rarely deserve what happens to them 
- X said they generally deserve what happens to them"; "X said their life is rarely just - X said their life is 
generally just". 
 
Victim innocence (two items; r = .87, p < .001). "X is not guilty of what happened to them - X is very much 
guilty of what happened to them"; "X is not responsible for what happened to them – X is very much 
responsible for what happened to them".  Only participants in the victim conditions answered to these 
items.  
 
Target suffering (five items; α = .85). "X lives an unserious situation - X lives a very serious situation"; "X 
does not suffer physically at all – X suffers a lot physically"; "X does not suffer psychologically at all – X 
suffers a lot psychologically"; " X is not a victim at all - X is very much a victim"; "X's life is very much 
similar to the life of a typical university student - X's life is not similar at all to the life of a typical 
university student" (reverse coded). We ran an exploratory factorial analysis with Varimax rotation and 
listwise deletion. It indicated three factors with eigenvalues > 1 accounting for 78.72% of variance. The 
factor structure reflected the aforementioned distribution of items. We thus computed scores within each 
construct by averaging across items, with higher scores indicating stronger endorsement of the construct.  
 
Dependent Variables 
The participants rated the targets on 23 adjectives by indicating how much they agreed the adjectives 
characterized the targets on 7-point Likert-type scales (1 = I don't agree at all; 7 = I agree very much)5.  
 
Positive social utility (four items; α = .75). "Independent" ("independente"); "competitive" 
("competitivo/a"); "hard-working" (trabalhador/a"); "competent" ("competente"). 
 
Positive Social desirability (four items; α = .78). "Tolerant" ("tolerante"); "polite" ("educado"); "nice" 
("simpático/a"); "sincere" ("sincero/a"). 
 
Negative social utility (six items; α = .86). "Selfish" (egoísta"); "immature" ("imaturo/a"); "inconsciente" 
("unconscientious"); "irresponsible" ("irresponsável"); "lazy" (preguiçoso/a). 
                                                        
5 In order to decide which adjectives to use in the study, we first asked 24 pre-testers to read our scenarios (four pre-testers by 
scenario) and to characterise the targets with up to 10 adjectives. Because we felt difficulty in categorizing various positive 
adjectives as social utility or social desirability ones, we decided to use those in Alves and Correia (2008, 2010a) and to add the 
negative ones suggested by pre-testers. We added five adjectives for exploratory purposes only - "emotional" ("emotivo/a"), 
"optimistic" ("otimista"), "rational" ("racional"), "realistic" ("realista"), "useful" ("útil") - but they were not taken into account in the 
analyses. Participants thus judged the targets by rating them on 33 adjectives but we only analysed 28. An exploratory factorial 
analysis with Varimax rotation indicated five factors with eigenvalues > 1 accounting for 59.79% of the variance. After conducting 
the factorial analysis, we excluded five other adjectives. Two of them, "looney" ("alucinado") and "nutcase" ("avariado"), were 
excluded because they alone comprised Factor 5. The remaining three - "resigned" ("conformado"), "determined" ("determinado") 
and "intelligent" ("inteligente") - were excluded because they had similar loadings on two factors. We then reran the analyses 
without these five adjectives and got a four-factor solution explaining 65.77% of the variance.  
 
 
Are victims also judged more positively if they say their lives are just? 
Copyright © 2015 Associação Portuguesa de Psicologia   76 
 
Negative social desirability (nine items; α = .93). "Annoyed" ("chateado/a"); "depressed" ("deprimido/a"); 
"unhappy" ("infeliz"); "insecure" ("inseguro/a"); "whiny" ("queixoso/a"); "sad" ("triste"); "angry" 
("zangado/a"); "good-humoured" ("bem-humorado/a"); "confident" ("confiante")6.  
 
We computed scores within each construct by averaging across items, with higher scores indicating 
stronger endorsement of the construct. We should note that in most research only adjectives with 
positive valence have been used (Alves & Correia, 2008, 2010a, 2013). Although Testé and Perrin (2013) 
used adjectives with negative valence, they reversed them and created only two indices: one of social 
utility and another of social desirability. We decided to create four indices because they reflect the 
factorial analysis that we conducted (see footnote 4). Furthermore, these indices allowed us to explore 
whether there were different patterns between the negative and the positive dimensions of social value.  
 
RESULTS 
Manipulation Checks 
In order to check whether participants understood PBJW expression, victim innocence and 
suffering (and lack thereof of the non-victim) as intended, we ran two 2 (degree of expressed PBJW: 
high/low) X 3 (target identity: innocent victim/non-innocent victim/non-victim) ANOVAs on degree of 
PBJW expressed and target suffering. We also ran a 2 (degree of expressed PBJW: high/low) X 2 (target 
identity: innocent victim/non-innocent victim) on victim innocence.  
As far as PBJW expression is concerned, there was only a significant effect of expressed PBJW, such 
that the targets who expressed high PBJW were judged as having said their lives were more just (M = 
6.02, SD = 1.47) than targets who expressed low PBJW (M = 1.82, SD = 1.33), F(1, 180) = 418.91, p < .001, 
η2p = .70. 
In respect to victim innocence, the victims presented as innocent were judged as less responsible 
for/guilty of their situation (M = 1.96, SD = 1.36) than the victims presented as non-innocent (M = 5.29, SD 
= 1.82), F(1, 121) = 137.01, p < .001, η2p = .53). There was also a significant, albeit much weaker, effect of 
expressed PBJW, such that the victims who expressed high PBJW were judged as more responsible/guilty 
(M = 3.96, SD = 2.42) than victims who expressed low PBJW (M = 3.31, SD = 2.16), F(1, 121) = 4.87, p = .03, 
η2p = .04. 
Finally, as regards suffering, the non-victims were judged as suffering less (M = 3.49, SD = 0.96) 
than both the innocent (M = 5.18, SD = 0.71) and the non-innocent victims (M = 4.96, SD = 0.84, p < .001), 
F(1, 180) = 84.88, p < .001, η2p = .49. Furthermore, a weaker effect of PBJW expression revealed that the 
targets who expressed high PBJW were judged as suffering less (M = 4.26, SD = 1.19) than those who 
expressed low PBJW (M = 4.84, SD = 0.98), F(1, 180) = 26.28, p < .001, η2p = .13. 
In sum, the degree of expressed PBJW and victim innocence were manipulated successfully. Also as 
intended, innocent and non-innocent victims were judged as suffering at an equivalent level and more so 
than the non-victims.  
 
Main Analyses 
In order to test our hypotheses, we ran four 2 (degree of expressed PBJW: high/low) X 3 (target identity: 
innocent victim/non-innocent victim/non-victim) ANOVAs, one for each positive and negative dimension 
of social value7. Degrees of freedom vary among analyses due to missing responses on different measures. 
As can be seen in Table 1, there were PBJW main effects on all four dependent variables, Fs ≥ 14.03, 
ps < .001, η2ps  ≥ .07. Consistent with H1, the targets who expressed high versus low PBJW were on the 
                                                        
6 Although the latter two adjectives are positively balanced we have decided to keep them to be faithful to the factorial structure. 
Furthermore, results did not change when we excluded them. 
7 We chose not to use a mixed-measures ANOVA with the dimensions of social value as the repeated factor, which would allow us to 
compare among the four dependent variables, because some participants did not respond to all items (as can be seen in the different 
degrees of freedom of the ANOVAs). As a result, they would be excluded from all analyses. Furthermore, comparing among the four 
variables is not the focus of this article. Also, the significant differences between the positive and the negative valences of each 
dimension would not reflect different patterns, but mostly mean differences due to the fact that a negative dimension is the 
“reverse” of its positive counter-part. Nevertheless, we report the effects obtained with the mixed-measures ANOVA. The 
conclusions we get are the same with only slight variations of the means and standard deviations. A 2 (degree of expressed PBJW: 
high/low) X 3 (target identity: innocent victim/non-innocent victim/non-victim) X 4 (dimensions of social value: positive social 
utility/ negative social utility/ positive social desirability/ negative social desirability), with the latter factor as within-participants, 
indicated the following significant effects: degree of PBJW expressed, F(1, 174) = 34.30,p < .001, η2p= .17; target identity, F(2, 174) = 
7.29, p = .001, η2p = .08; dimensions of social value, F(3, 522) = 89.19, p < .001, η2p = .34; degree of PBJW expressed * dimensions of 
social value, F(3, 522) = 101.84, p < .001, η2p = .38; target identity * dimensions of social value, F(6, 522) = 50.54, p < .001, η2p = .37; 
degree of PBJW expressed * target identity * dimensions of social value, F(6, 522) = 3.06, p = .01, η2p = .03. 
 
 
 
Alves, Breyner, Nunes, Pereira, Silva e Soares 
Copyright © 2015 Associação Portuguesa de Psicologia  77 
whole judged as more positively useful and desirable, and as less negatively useful and desirable. There 
were also target identity main effects on all four dependent variables, Fs ≥ 8.38, ps < .001, η2ps  ≥ .09. As 
can be seen in Table 2, and consistent with H2, the targets presented as non-victims were always judged 
as the most positively and the least negatively useful and desirable ones. Nevertheless, there were other 
patterns worth mentioning. In the case of positive social utility and negative social desirability, the 
innocent and the non-innocent victims were judged as equally low. In the case of positive social 
desirability and negative social utility, however, the non-innocent victim was the most harshly judged 
target, with the innocent victim being judged as highly as the non-victim. 
 
Table 1. Means (and standard deviations) of positive and negative social utility and social desirability by 
expressed Personal Belief in a Just World (PBJW) 
 Low PBJW High PBJW F test 
Positive social utility 3.30 (1.23) 3.79 (1.26) F(1, 175) = 14.03, p < .001, η2p = .07 
Positive social desirability 3.73 (1.05) 4.70 (1.01) F(1, 177) = 44.37, p < .001, η2p = .20 
Negative social utility 3.20 (1.46) 2.50 (1.22) F(1, 179) = 24.39, p < .001, η2p = .12 
Negative social desirability 5.51 (0.93) 3.17 (1.20) F(1, 176) = 271.52, p < .001, η2p = .60 
 
Table 2. Means (and standard deviations) of positive and negative social utility and social desirability by 
target identity 
 Innocent 
victim 
Non-innocent 
victim 
Non-victim F test 
Positive social utility 3.08 (0.97)a 2.85 (0.92)a 4.70 (0.99)b F(2, 175) = 72.14, p < .001, η2p = .45 
Positive social desirability 4.53 (1.13)a 3.83 (1.12)b 4.31 (1.07)a F(2, 177) = 8.38, p < .001, η2p = .09 
Negative social utility 2.12 (0.93)a 4.10 (1.22)b 2.27 (0.97)a F(2, 179) = 79.67, p < .001, η2p = .20 
Negative social desirability 4.48 (1.56)a 4.65 (1.23)a 3.84 (1.82)b F(2, 178) = 13.61, p < .001, η2p = .13 
Note. Values in line with different subscripts are different at p < .05 (Tukey post-hoc tests) 
 
Further analyses supported the hypothesis that participants would focus on the social value of 
PBJW (H4) rather than on the fact that the victims suffered very much and permanently (H3) or on their 
(non)innocence (H5.1 – H5.4). This inference derives from the interaction on negative social desirability, 
which can be consulted in Table 3. Tukey post-hoc tests indicated that the three targets who expressed 
high versus low PBJW were judged less negatively (no significant differences among the three targets 
who expressed low PBJW, ps ≥ .87). Indeed, the interaction is significant because the non-victim who 
expresses high PBJW is even less negatively judged than the victims who also express high PBJW.  
 
Table 3. Means (and standard deviations) of positive and negative social utility and social desirability by 
expressed Personal Belief in a Just World (PBJW) and target identity  
 Low PBJW High PBJW  
 
innocent 
victim 
non-
innocent 
victim 
non-
victim 
innocent 
victim 
non-innocent 
victim 
non-
victim 
F test 
Positive Social 
Utility 
2.94  
(1.00) 
2.57  
(0.92) 
4.35  
(0.96) 
3.22  
(0.94) 
3.13 
 (0.86) 
5.06  
(0.90) 
F(2, 175) = 0.69, p 
=.45, η2p = .01 
Positive Social 
Desirability 
4.02  
(1.08) 
3.31  
(1.14) 
3.86  
(0.80) 
5.03  
(0.95) 
4.31  
(0.88) 
4.78  
(1.11) 
F(2, 177) = 0.34, p 
= .97, η2p < .001 
Negative Social 
Utility 
2.25  
(1.06) 
4.61  
(1.07) 
2.72  
(1.00) 
1.99  
(0.78) 
3.62  
(1.18) 
1.83 
 (0.72) 
F(2, 179) = 2.48, p 
= .09, η2p = .03 
Negative Social 
Desirability 
5.65a  
(0.90) 
5.51a  
(0.92) 
5.37a 
 (0.97) 
3.35b  
(1.19) 
3.85b  
(0.92) 
2.26c  
(0.89) 
F(2, 178) = 8.54, p 
< .001, η2p = .09 
Note. Values with different subscripts are different at p < .001.  
 
DISCUSSION 
Research on PBJW expression has consistently shown that non-victimized targets are judged as having 
more social value if they say their lives are generally versus rarely just (Alves & Correia, 2010a, 2013; 
Testé et al., 2012; Testé & Perrin, 2013). Specifically, they are judged to a higher extent as having both 
what it takes to be successful (i.e., social utility) and what it takes to be liked (i.e., social desirability) 
(Beauvois, 1995; Beauvois & Dépret, 2008; Cambon, 2006). These results have been interpreted as 
indicating that the expression of high PBJW is a judgment norm (Alves & Correia, 2010a). With this study 
our main goal was to test whether the social value of high versus low PBJW expression is also stronger 
when the targets are presented as innocent or non-innocent victims. As a secondary goal, we also 
intended to test whether the social value of PBJW would differ depending on the valence of the social 
value dimensions. 
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Our results are very clear: the expression of PBJW is socially valued regardless of whether the 
targets are non-victims or (non-)innocent victims who suffer intensely and permanently. Indeed, 
participants consistently judged the targets who expressed high versus PBJW more positively on the 
positive dimensions of social value. Furthermore, they judged those targets less negatively on the 
negative dimensions of social value. The effects were stronger on social desirability, especially negative 
social desirability, than on social utility.  
The degree of expressed PBJW and target identity only interacted significantly on negative social 
desirability. Even in this case, however, there was not a reversal of the general pattern. Specifically, all 
targets expressing high versus low PBJW were judged less negatively on this dimension of social value. 
This interaction simply reflected the fact that the non-victim who expressed high PBJW was judged even 
less negatively than their victim counterparts. We are aware, however, that a less benign interpretation of 
this pattern is possible. In fact, by drawing a parallel with the literature on racism (e.g., Pettigrew & 
Marteens, 1995), this pattern may reflect an example of blatant victimization, that is, a direct indication 
that victims have more negative value than non-victims. This interpretation is also supported by the main 
effect of target identity. Specifically, participants judged the non-victims as having the highest positive 
and the lowest negative social value. Judgments of the non-innocent victims indicated the reversed 
pattern. In the case of innocent victims, participants judged their social value at an intermediate level. In 
fact, depending on the dimension and valence of social value, participants judged the innocent victims as 
equivalent to the non-innocent victims (low positive social utility and high negative social desirability) or 
the non-victims (low negative social utility and high positive social desirability).  
At this point we would like to stress that the effects involving the expression of PBJW were 
stronger on social desirability than on social utility. In our view, this may be explained by the fact that 
most targets were highly suffering and disabled victims, thus having low market value in our society (i.e., 
social utility). Thus, the social value of high PBJW expression was more reflected in their social 
desirability than on their social utility. Consistent with this view, the main effect of target identity was felt 
more strongly on social utility than on social desirability. We should stress that previous research found 
that the expression of different degrees of PBJW also influenced social desirability judgments (e.g., Alves 
& Correia, 2010a). In contrast to our study, however, in those studies the influence of expressed PBJW on 
social utility was stronger than on social desirability (Testé & Perrin, 2013). This contrast between our 
study and previous research is an interesting finding. 
Indeed, as far as we know, the literature has only ascertained that the attribution of social utility or 
social desirability to targets may differ across the judgment norms they express. In other words, two 
judgment norms may differ in the extent to which they are anchored on one or the other dimension of 
social value (e.g., Dubois, 2005; Dubois & Beauvois, 2005). Our study suggests, however, that these 
anchors may not necessarily be fixed within a given judgment norm. Instead, they may vary depending on 
target identity. Future research should investigate this matter into more detail and identify factors that 
may change the anchorage of social value within judgment norms (e.g., contextual factors).  
We would like to indicate some limitations that should be addressed in future research. First, we 
did not manipulate victim suffering which was presented as very serious and permanent. This was mainly 
intended to test whether the social value of PBJW expression resisted to an extreme example of injustice. 
Possibly, the effect of PBJW expressed should be stronger on social utility than social desirability if victim 
suffering is less serious (thus having a higher market value). Furthermore, it would also be interesting to 
present targets as either responsible or non-responsible for an accident resulting in no suffering. In this 
way the victims would have more in common with the non-victims. Second, we only presented victims of 
a car accident. Thus, we cannot rule out that in other kinds of victimization the results would be different. 
We think it would be fruitful to also present victims whose suffering is perceived as resulting from a 
breach in moral norms. Finally, our study clearly indicates that these three targets are judged more 
positively and less negatively when they express high versus low PBJW. Nevertheless, the reasons 
underlying these judgments may not be the same or, at least, they may differ in strength according to 
target identity. Future research should thus identify possible mediators. For instance, it is possible that 
non-victims who express high versus low PBJW are more socially valued mainly because they are 
perceived as having a discourse that fits societal norms. As stated in the introduction, this corresponds to 
the main assumption in research on PBJW expression, which has focused on non-victims as targets. In the 
case of innocent victims, the higher social value of those who express high versus low PBJW may derive 
mainly from their being perceived as individuals who have adapted psychologically to their situation, 
thus showing a more positive approach to life. In the case of non-innocent victims, the higher social value 
of those who express high versus low PBJW may derive from the fact that they accept responsibility (at 
least, discursively) for their situation. The assumed expression of personal responsibility corresponds to 
the norm of internality (Dubois, 1994), another judgment norm in individualistic societies and contexts.  
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CONCLUSION AND AFTERTHOUGHTS 
Despite the aforementioned limitations, we think this study represents an important contribution to 
research on PBJW expression. This study reinforces the notion that the expression of high PBJW is a 
judgment norm, that is, a valued discourse irrespective of its truth. This notion was reinforced to a 
surprising level.  
In fact, as researchers, we predicted the possibility that victims, both innocent and non-innocent, 
could be evaluated more positively if they expressed high versus low PBJW. As citizens, however, we 
admit this finding was a big surprise. Indeed, this finding indicates that the social value of the expression 
of high PBJW can be very resistant to contextual shifts, such that our independent variables only 
interacted on one out of four dependent variables. Even in this case, however, the patterns were not 
different for victims and non-victims; they were simply of different magnitude. Our results must thus not 
be seen as a “mere” replication of previous research on the normativity of PBJW. Instead, they show that 
the expression of PBJW is a socially demanded discursive performance even when it seems objectively 
unreasonable to make such demands. Given that our study is experimental, we cannot ascertain whether 
or not our results have ecological validity. Nevertheless, we hope they at least motivate people to reflect 
on one issue: as a community we may be pressurizing victims to express unreasonable claims about their 
lives.  
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